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1 Introduction
Mobile termination rates (MTRs) are the charges that mobile rms levy on xed networks
and other mobile operators for completing, or terminating, calls on their networks. In
the UK, the regulation of MTRs has been the subject of intense controversy for more than
a decade now. According to the prevailing theory (see Armstrong andWright 2009a; Arm-
strong 2002, Section 3.1; and Wright 2002), while competition between mobile networks
to attract new customers may be erce, in the absence of regulation they will still charge
monopoly-level prices to other networks for terminating calls to their subscribers. Once
a consumer subscribes to a particular mobile rm, callers on xed telephone and other
mobile networks must send their calls to that subscribers chosen network. No matter
how competitive the market for mobile subscribers may be, a mobile network holds a
monopoly over, and can charge high prices for, delivering calls to its own subscribers.1
Concerns about mobile call termination being a bottleneck service, and a history of high
termination charges, led to MTRs being regulated for the rst time in the UK in 1999, and
they have since been subject to price controls in every country in the European Union,
and in numerous other countries around the world.
In contrast, in the United States and Canada, as well as in Singapore, Hong Kong and
China, something close to Bill & Keep (B&K) has been adopted for mobile termination,
under which MTRs are set at (or near) zero at the wholesale level.2 In the United States
mobile termination charges are set to the same rate as a local xed-line call termination
at US 0.07 cents per minute, and are reciprocal.3 Singapore, Hong Kong and China all
have adopted Bill & Keep for wholesale interconnection charging, while in Canada mobile
networks pay for interconnecting tra¢ c to and from their networks. Thus, while in the
UK average mobile termination charges as of January 2011 exceeded US 6.5 cents per
minute, and remained highly controversial, in so-called "Bill & Keep" countries they have
been of little or no concern.
Until recently, the approach to regulating MTRs adopted by European regulatory au-
thorities, including the telecoms regulator Ofcom in the UK, had been to allow for total
1The characterization of mobile call termination as a monopoly or bottleneck service implicitly
assumes that mobile operators can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to xed-line operators and to each
other, which is typically justied by reference to various interconnectivity obligations. Binmore and
Harbord (2005) question this assumption, and provide an analysis of mobile call termination instead as
a bilateral-monopoly bargaining problem. See also Armstrong and Wright (2007, Section 3.5).
2In these countries mobile subscribers are also often charged for receiving calls, although this is not a
necessary outcome.
3Some mobile networks have negotiated B&K arrangements. These agreements are condential, so
the extent of their use is unknown. See OECD (2012).
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cost recovery based on fully-allocated network cost models.4 This approach has been in-
creasingly called into question, however, by a new body of economic literature highlighting
the two-sided nature of mobile interconnection markets and the signicant role that call
externalities play in the analysis of competition, equilibrium pricing, and entry in these
markets.5 Impetus for change also came from the entry of new mobile network operators
in many European countries, which argued that their growth and protability was being
hampered by high MTRs and the signicant levels of on-net/o¤-net price discrimination
adopted by the incumbent mobile network operators.
In May 2009, the European Commission (EC, 2009a) issued a Recommendation on the
Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU which embodied
much of this new economic thinking, and proposed dramatic reductions in MTRs to reect
the actual incremental costs of providing voice call termination services to third parties.6
Ofcom subsequently published a consultation document (Ofcom, 2009a) which considered
the pros and cons of a number of alternative approaches to regulating MTRs discussed
in the EC Recommendation. These were: (i) pricing at pure long-run incremental cost
(pure LRIC), broadly the approach recommended by the EC; (ii) imposing reciprocity
with xed networks, i.e. setting mobile termination charges to match the regulated rates
of xed-line network operators, as practiced in the USA; and (iii) adopting Bill & Keep,
which would e¤ectively abolish mobile termination charges by setting them equal to zero.
While the rst option is in line with the ECs Recommendation, reciprocity with xed
networks would also signicantly reduce MTRs. Bill & Keep would entail the most dra-
matic change in policy, but variants of it have already been adopted in a number of
countries, as noted above, and it was recently recommended by the European Regulators
Group (ERG, 2009). In March 2011 Ofcom published a decision (in Ofcom 2011a) re-
quiring UK mobile operators to reduce MTRs from values which then exceeded 4.15 ppm
to 0.72 ppm (its estimate of pure LRIC) by 2014/15.7 While these reductions will still
result in MTRs in the UK an order of magnitude above those in the United States, they
4This led to regulated MTRs in the UK ranging from 11.7 pence per minute (ppm) in 1999 to over
4 ppm in 2010/11, with corresponding implications for the prices of o¤-net calls which far exceeded the
marginal costs of routing calls between networks. See Section 2
5See, for example, DeGraba (2003); Jeon et al. (2004); Berger (2004) (2005); Hoernig (2007)(2009);
Calzada and Valletti (2008); Hermalin and Katz (2011); Armstrong and Wright (2009b); and Cabral
(2011). Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) provide a survey of much of this literature.
6While not binding on member states, national regulatory authorities such as Ofcom are required to
take "utmost account" of the EC recommendation. See also the accompanying documents (EC, 2009b;
2009c).
7Following an appeal by the companies, in February 2012 the UK´s Competition Commission recom-
mended slightly deeper reductions to 0.65 ppm and a shorter transition period (Competition Commission
2012).
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represent a signicant shift in regulatory policy and a progressive convergence with B&K
or near B&K countries.
The debate in the UK and Europe over the ECs Recommendation, while being erce,
has su¤ered from a lack of any serious quantitative assessment of the likely e¤ects of
the proposed reductions in MTRs on prices, welfare, and consumer and producer surplus
in telecommunications markets. Both Ofcom and the European Commission discussed
the pros and cons of the various approaches to regulating MTRs in a purely qualitative
and largely informal way. What has been lacking is a rigorous quantitative framework
that allows us to capture the welfare consequences of adopting one or another of the
alternatives being discussed. The principal purpose of this paper is to provide such a
framework and assessment for the UK mobile market.
The main obstacle to applying models of telecommunications competition to real-world
markets to date has been the need to assume either a duopoly market, or symmetric
rms, since models with several asymmetric networks were considered intractable.8 Few
real-world mobile markets in Europe or elsewhere satisfy either of these assumptions,
however. In this paper, we present an analytically tractable model of competition between
multiple mobile networks with asymmetries in market shares and costs which allows us
to estimate the impact on total welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus of a
decrease in MTRs in the UK mobile market from their 2010 levels to one or another of the
alternatives described above. Our model (which builds on Hoernig 2010) thus overcomes
the limitations of earlier models, and allows for a more realistic quantitative assessment
of changes in regulatory policy towards interconnection pricing than had previously been
possible.
We calibrate this model to the UK mobile telephony market allowing for four mobile
networks, calls to and from the xed network, network-based price discrimination, and
call externalities, and solve for the equilibrium multi-part tari¤s under alternative as-
sumptions concerning the level of MTRs and the ratio of receiver to sender benets (the
call externality parameter in our model). Our results in Section 5.1 show that although
consumer surplus and economic welfare may decrease in the mobile market considered
in isolation as we reduce the level of MTRs, aggregate welfare and consumer surplus
increase in the telecommunications market as a whole for all reasonable values of the call
externality parameter. Depending on the strength of call externalities, our model predicts
market-wide welfare improvements of £ 900 million to £ 4.5 billion per annum, with Bill
8Armstrong and Wright (2009a) and Sauer (2011) are examples of recent papers which assume sym-
metric duopoly models to analyze the welfare implications of changes in MTRs. An exception to this is
Hurkens and Lopez (2011).
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& Keep resulting in the greatest increase in overall welfare.
A number of recent papers have argued that reducing MTRs will necessarily reduce
consumer surplus, and possibly welfare, in the mobile market (Gans and King, 2001;
Hoernig, 2008; Armstrong and Wright, 2009a). Indeed, the Royal Economic Societys
media brieng (European Decision on Mobile Charges May Not Benet Customers)
recently emphasized this aspect of the Armstrong and Wright (2009a) analysis, suggest-
ing that, reducing termination charges to very low levels  such as those in the EUs
guidance  may come at a cost to mobile subscribers since ultimately mobile operators
may end up competing less aggressively for their customers. Specically, the argument
is that high xed-to-mobile termination charges create prots for mobile rms, some or
all of which is passed on to mobile subscribers via the "waterbed e¤ect".9 Hence mo-
bile subscribers should prefer xed-to-mobile termination rates set at the monopoly (i.e.
prot-maximizing) level. In addition, mobile subscribers may benet from high mobile-
to-mobile termination rates, since these make o¤-net calls more expensive than on-net
calls, creating network e¤ects which favour larger networks. This intensies competition
between networks to attract subscribers, which reduces their equilibrium subscription
charges. The much-cited result is that equilibrium consumer surplus on mobile networks
is increasing in the level of the mobile-to-mobile termination rate (Gans and King, 2001;
Armstrong and Wright, 2009a).
As we discuss in more detail in Section 5.2, however, these arguments are incomplete
and do not necessarily survive the inclusion of call externalities and a more realistic
number of competing networks in the analysis. The argument with respect to xed-
to-mobile termination rates loses much of its force when call externalities, or receiver
benets, matter. With a high ratio of receiver to sender benets (i.e. the call externality
parameter in our model), welfare on mobile networks becomes a decreasing function of the
level of MTRs. The argument that above-cost, mobile-to-mobile termination rates benet
mobile consumers, is only necessarily true in models with at most two mobile networks,
as rst demonstrated by Hoernig (2010). With n > 2 networks, although a reduction in
the mobile-to-mobile termination rate still mitigates network e¤ects, and hence relaxes
competition between mobile networks for market share, the reduction in competition may
or may not be su¢ cient to reduce consumer surplus in equilibrium, and it is less likely to
do so the more signicant are call externalities.
9The waterbed e¤ect refers to the phenomenon whereby a reduction (or increase) in MTRs leads to
a corresponding increase (or reduction) in subscription charges to mobile subscribers. See Armstrong
and Wright (2009a, pp. F284-285). Genakos and Valletti (2011) present some empirical evidence on the
strength of this e¤ect in twenty countries.
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It is thus an empirical question whether a reduction in MTRs will result in an increase
or a decrease in welfare and consumer surplus on mobile networks considered in isolation.
In our simulations we nd that welfare increases in both the mobile and xed markets when
MTRs are reduced, and consumer surplus in the mobile market increases for reasonable
values of the call externality parameter. Hence, the trade-o¤ between increasing welfare
and maintaining consumer surplus in the mobile market disappears once these factors are
taken into account.
Our model thus provides a rigorous and quantiable approach to assessing the likely
consequences of changes in policy towards regulating MTRs, in the UK and elsewhere.10
Another natural application is to analyze the recent merger between Orange and T-Mobile,
which has created a single rm with about 40% of all UK mobile subscribers. Doing so
allows us to predict the mergers e¤ects on economic e¢ ciency, consumer welfare and
mobile rmsprots.
We show in Section 6 that with MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the
overall e¤ect of the merger depends on the strength of call externalities. For low receiver
benets the merger may be welfare-improving (if we allow for the cost savings posited by
the merged rms), by moving more subscribers on to a single large network, thus avoiding
the ine¢ ciencies associated with high o¤-net call prices, themselves partially a product of
MTRs which exceed marginal cost. In other words, the merger may help to ameliorate
the negative e¤ects of above-cost MTRs, allowed until recently by the UK regulatory
authorities.
When call externalities are signicant, this result is reversed by the strategic incentive
of the newly-merged rm to increase its o¤-net call prices.11 Hence there is a critical
level of the call externality parameter for which the merger becomes harmful to allocative
e¢ ciency and welfare. When call externalities are large, we predict that overall welfare
losses from the merger exceeding £ 900 million per year, more than double the cost savings
of £ 390 - £ 420 million per year predicted by the companies themselves. With much lower
MTRs, such as "pure LRIC" or Bill & Keep, the e¤ects of the merger on aggregate welfare
are much reduced, however.
Since the merger reduces the number of competitors in the mobile market, it reduces
the intensity of competition between mobile networks. This induces mobile rms to raise
the level of their xed charges, increasing prots at the expense of consumer surplus.
10The model has also been calibrated to predict the e¤ects of changes in regulatory policy towards
MTRs in Mexico, Colombia and New Zealand.
11It is a standard result of the literature that, in the presence of call externalities, a networks o¤-net
prices are increasing in its own market share. See Jeon et al. (2004); Hoernig (2007)(2010); and Harbord
and Pagnozzi (2010).
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The resulting losses in consumer surplus under current MTRs exceed £ 1.2 billion per
annum for all values of the ratio of receiver/sender benets. If MTRs were signicantly
reduced prior to the merger (to Bill & Keep), the consumer surplus losses are about £ 900
million per annum, almost all of which translates into higher prots for the mobile rms.
Although the European Commission approved the merger, subject to certain undertakings
agreed by the companies (see EC, 2010), it is di¢ cult to see how these conditions could
have allayed the competition-related concerns illustrated by our calibrated model.12
Section 2 of the paper provides a brief overview of the UK telecoms market in 2010/11.
Section 3 describes the market model. Section 4 details our calibration to UK market data
and Section 5.1 the results derived using the calibrated model. Section 5.2 discusses these
results and considers longer-run implications of reducing MTRs. Section 6 reports on the
e¤ects of the Orange/T-Mobile merger, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The UK Telecoms Market
The mobile industry in the UK currently has around 81 million subscribers and consists of
four networks, Vodafone, O2, Everything Everywhere (EE - the recently merged Orange
and T-Mobile) and the smaller 3G network, Hutchison 3G (H3G). Network subscriber
numbers and market shares as of the end of 2010 are shown in Table 2.1 below. Orange
and T-Mobile merged their networks in the second quarter of 2010. Prior to the merger
each company had about a 21% market share.
Table 2.1 Subscribers and Market Shares, 2010
H3G Vodafone O213 EE14
Subscribers (m) 5.55 20.08 24.28 31.20
Market Shares (%) 6.84 24.76 29.93 38.47
Source: Ofcom (2011b)
Total annual retail revenue for mobile networks in 2010 was about £ 15 billion and
mobile call termination generated revenue of approximately £ 2.95 billion (Ofcom 2011c).
As of 2003, Ofcom has consistently determined that the mobile retail market in the UK
is e¤ectively competitive, and since the merger of Orange and T-Mobile has found no
indication that competitive pressures have signicantly reduced (Ofcom 2011d). On the
other hand, as noted by Armstrong and Wright (2009a), Ofcom has equally consistently
12These conditions were a revised network-sharing agreement with H3G UK and an o¤er to divest 15
MHz of spectrum at the 1800 MHz level.
13Includes about 2m Tesco Mobile subscribers.
14Includes about 4.5m Virgin Mobile subscribers.
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ruled that each mobile network is a monopolist with respect to call termination on its own
network, given that a call to someones mobile phone necessarily involves the call being
terminated by the mobile network to which the person has subscribed.
The xed-line sector had 33.3 million subscribers at the end of 2010, slightly less than
a year previously. British Telecoms (BTs) share of xed-line subscribers was 48.2%,
followed by the cable operator Virgin Media with 14.7%, and others with 37%.15 Annual
revenues from xed-line call and access services was about £ 9.2 billion. Fixed-to-mobile
(FTM) calls accounted for 35% of total call revenues in 2010, while accounting for less
than 10% of overall xed call minutes. BTs margin, or "retention" on FTM calls, i.e. the
di¤erence between its FTM retail price and the mobile termination charge, was subject
to regulation in 1999, but has been unregulated since 2003.
2.1 Mobile Call Termination Regulation
The regulation of mobile termination rates in the UK has generated huge amounts of reg-
ulatory controversy, and been the subject of ve competition commission enquiries and
numerous court cases since its inception in 1998. In that year the then UK telecommuni-
cations regulator, Oftel, proposed reductions in the xed-to-mobile termination rates of
the two largest mobile networks, BTs Cellnet (the precursor to the current O2) and Voda-
fone. These reductions were challenged by the mobile companies (with BTs support),
leading to an enquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (see MMC 1999), the
precursor of the current Competition Commission.16 The MMC concluded that Cellnets
and Vodafones FTM termination rates were too high in relation to overall costs, and
they were subsequently regulated with a price cap, reducing these charges in 1999 by
approximately 33% to 11.7 ppm.
The expiry of this price cap in March 2002 led to an enquiry by the Competition
Commission (see Competition Commission 2003) which upheld Oftels new price cap cov-
ering all four mobile networks and both FTM and mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination
charges. Shortly before the 2002 enquiry, a fth network, H3G, had entered the market,
although this incipient network was excluded from the investigation. Subsequent decisions
by Ofcom (the current UK telecommunications regulator) in 2004 and 2007 extended these
regulations, progressively reducing both FTM and MTM termination rates, and by 2007
subjecting all ve networks (including H3G) to MTR price cap regulation.
15The majority of these are "indirect access" providers which use BT´s xed line network to o¤er
services via wholesale line rental and local loop unbundling.
16The enquiry did not include mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination charges, nor the FTM termination
rates of the two smaller networks, Orange and T-Mobile, which had only recently entered the market.
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Table 2.2 shows the history of average mobile termination charges from 2001 to 2006
for all UK networks: termination charges approximately halved over this period due to
tightened regulation.
Table 2.2. Average Mobile Termination Charges to 2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All UK Networks (ppm, nominal) 11.1 10.7 9.9 7.9 5.9 5.5
Source: Ofcom (2007b), Figure 4.40
The regulated termination charges in Table 2.2 include two kinds of markup over es-
timates of marginal or incremental termination costs. The rst markup was designed
to tax xed-line callers to subsidize mobile network subscriptions in order to stimulate
mobile network expansion. The second markup reected an intended contribution to a
mobile networks xed and common costs. The rst markup was referred to as the net-
work externality surcharge", and was introduced after the Competition Commissions
2002 enquiry (see Competition Commission 2003, pp. 225-252).17 In its 2008/09 enquiry,
following appeals of Ofcoms 2007 MTR decision by BT and H3G, the Competition Com-
mission revisited the issue and decided that a network externality surcharge was no longer
justied (see Competition Commission, 2009, Section 4).
Table 2.3 shows the regulatedMTRs of the ve mobile networks from 2007/08-2010/11.
These charges reect di¤erences in the underlying costs for di¤erent mobile technologies
using di¤erent spectrum bands. As a result, by 2010/11 the same charge was set for the
2G/3G companies (Vodafone, O2, T-Mobile and Orange), based on the average costs of
a hypothetical e¢ cient operator. H3G continued to receive a higher charge, recognizing
the higher xed costs it faced as a 3G-only entrant (Ofcom 2011, para 2.15).
Table 2.3 Mobile Termination Charges (in 2006/07 prices)
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Vodafone & O2 5.5 5.4 4.4 4.0
T-Mobile & Orange 6.0 5.7 4.5 4.0
H3G 8.9 7.5 5.5 4.3
Source: Ofcom (2011), Table 2.3
As noted in the Introduction, until 2010/11 Ofcom regulated the mobile rmsMTRs
using a fully-allocated network cost model to estimate "LRIC+". Following the European
Commissions 2009 Recommendation, Ofcom changed its methodology with a proposal to
17Network externality surcharges have also been applied in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden (Cullen
International, 2008), although the European Commission (EC, 2009b) now recommends against this
policy.
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reduce MTRs to reect its estimates of "pure LRIC". Table 2.4 shows the resulting
price caps from 2010/11 to 2014/15. It also shows the recalculated charges and faster
glide path proposed by the Competition Commission in February 2012 (see Competition
Commission 2012), following appeals of Ofcoms new pure LRIC-based charges by all four
mobile networks and BT.
Table 2.4. Mobile Termination Charges (in 2008/09 prices)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Ofcom 2011 4.18 (4.48) 2.69 1.74 1.12 0.72
CC 2012 4.18 (4.48) 2.29 1.25 0.67 0.65
Source: CC (2012) (charges in parentheses for 2010/11 refer to H3G)
As noted above, since 2002 the price caps for FTM and MTM termination rates have
been set equal to each other, although there has been no regulatory constraint preventing
the networks from setting di¤erent MTM and FTM termination charges. The actual FTM
and MTM termination charges set by networks have always been equal to the maximum
allowed charge, however.18
2.2 Prices and Call Volumes
Table 2.5 below shows the average pence per-minute retail prices for on-net and o¤-net
MTM calls, as well as mobile-to-xed (MTF) calls, from 2005 (see Armstrong and Wright
2009a and Harbord and Pagnozzi 2010 for further discussions of the evidence on this
score). From 2007-2009, Ofcom stopped reporting separate gures for o¤-net versus on-
net call revenues and volumes, hence these gures are absent.19
The decline in o¤-net MTM retail call prices over the period is no doubt partly, or
largely, due to the reductions in termination charges documented in Tables 2.1 to 2.4
above. Despite the narrowing of the di¤erentials between o¤-net and on-net calls prices,
the di¤erences remain signicant in percentage terms. Note that average on-net call
prices have been consistently much lower than the corresponding MTRs, illustrating the
oft-observed fact that mobile networks do not treat regulatory estimates of LRIC+as
costs that need to be recovered from calls made on their own networks. In the absence
18Armstrong and Wright (2009a) provide theoretical arguments both for why and why not mobile
networks should want to set MTM charges lower than FTM charges, absent any regulatory constraints.
19It is a complicated and somewhat arbitrary task to give precise estimates for the prices of the various
types of calls and messages originating on mobile networks, due to the complexity and range of their
tari¤s. The on-net and o¤-net average prices in Table 2.5 ignore subscription or "access" charges, which
typically include a number of "free" minutes for all call types. Hence the absolute levels of these charges
is probably underestimated in Table 2.5, since it has implicitly been assumed that the marginal price of
a "within bundle" call is zero.
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of call externalities, theory predicts that the on-net/o¤-net price di¤erential will be equal
to the di¤erence between marginal termination costs and the termination rate. Unless
marginal termination costs are literally zero, this was never true in the UK according to
Ofcoms data.20
Table 2.5 Average price of mobile calls (ppm)
2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 (3rd quarter)
Mobile to xed calls 2.2 2.0 1.8
On-net MTM calls 4.1 3.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
O¤-net MTM calls 11.2 8.9 3.8 3.2 2.6
Price di¤erential, o¤-net minus on-net 7.1 5.4 2.3 1.7 1.3
Percent price di¤erential, o¤-net/on-net 63.4% 60.7% 60.3% 57.7% 50.3%
Source: Authorscalculations from Ofcom (2007b) and Ofcom (2011c)
Table 2.6 shows that the relative volumes of o¤-net and on-net calls have been con-
sistently unbalanced. On-net calls have consistently accounted for more than 30% of all
mobile-originated call minutes, while o¤-net call volumes have typically been only slightly
below or above 30%. As noted by Armstrong and Wright (2009a, p. F275), with equal
o¤-net and on-net charges and four roughly symmetric networks (i.e. prior to the merger
of Orange and T-Mobile), we would expect o¤-net tra¢ c to be approximately three times
greater than on-net tra¢ c, rather than the much lower volumes of o¤-net tra¢ c observed
in the data. The high prices for o¤-net calls relative to on-net calls shown in Table 2.5 is
likely responsible for much of this imbalance in calling patterns.21
Table 2.6. Shares of types of mobile call minutes
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (3rd quarter)
Mobile to xed calls 27.93% 25.52% 26.21% 25.61% 25.41%
On-net MTM calls 32.03% 34.45% 34.75% 35.64% 32.73%
O¤-net MTM calls 27.43% 27.14% 31.51% 30.47% 33.81%
Ratio: On-net/o¤-net 1.17 1.27 1.10 1.17 0.97
Source: Authorscalculations from Ofcom (2008) and Ofcom (2011c)
As found by our welfare analysis in Section 5.1 below, a major benet of reducing
MTRs is to reduce (or eliminate) the allocative ine¢ ciency caused by o¤-net charges which
signicantly exceed marginal costs, and which constitute a barrier to calling subscribers
on other networks.
20See Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) for further discussion of this point.
21Armstrong and Wright (2009a) suggest that closed user groups, i.e. groups of subscribers who
predominantly make calls within their own group, and substitution between MTM and FTM calls, may
also be partly responsible. Note, however, that the existence of closed user groups may itself be partly,
if not largely, explained by on-net/o¤-net price di¤erentials.
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Finally, Table 2.7 compares average FTM call prices versus average FTF call prices
since 2005.
Table 2.7 Average prices of xed-to-mobile calls (ppm)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
FTM calls 11.49 10.98 11.55 12.51 13.26 13.35
FTF calls 1.51 1.48 1.51 1.49 1.54 1.55
Price di¤erential, FTM-FTF 9.98 9.50 10.04 11.02 11.72 11.80
Source: Authorscalculations from Ofcom (2008) and Ofcom (2011c)
Observe that the average price di¤erential exceeds the FTM termination rate in every
year, and by increasing amounts. Indeed, the price di¤erential has been increasing slowly
as MTRs have been reduced, with only very small changes in the price of FTF calls. This
has led to complaints by the mobile rms that reductions in the FTM termination charge
do not benet consumers, but merely transfer prots from mobile companies to xed-line
operators (see Competition Commission 2012, Section 2). The lack of responsiveness of
FTM prices to reductions in MTRs is di¢ cult to explain, even if one assumes (as we do in
our simulations reported in Section 5.1 below) that there is a single monopoly xed-line
operator.
3 A Model of the UK Mobile Communications Mar-
ket
Our model of the UK mobile communications market is a generalization of the network
competition models of La¤ont et al. (1998) and Carter andWright (1999)(2003) to include
many asymmetric networks and calls to and from a xed network. For more details on the
theory see Hoernig (2010).22 We extend the Hoernig (2010) model by explicitly including
a xed network and by determining the market equilibrium following the merger of two
networks which retain their separate brands, or identities, as described below in Section
3.3.23
22Several papers have analysed network competition with more than two networks. Symmetric networks
are assumed by Calzada and Valletti (2008) and Armstrong and Wright (2009b). Dewenter and Haucap
(2005) consider more than two asymmetric networks, but can only solve for the resulting per-minute call
prices. Closest to Hoernig (2010) is Thompson, Renard and Wright (2007), which uses a similar demand
specication and considers an arbitrary number of networks. However, networks in their model do not
price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls, which signicantly reduces the complexity of the
modeling. Even so, no closed-form solution for the equilibrium is derived.
23This is the relevant case as Orange and T-Mobile have maintained their individual brands following
their merger, but share their networks and costs. See Ofcom (2010a, p. 320) and the Everything
Everywhere Ltd website (everythingeverywhere.com).
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3.1 Model Setup
Networks: We assume n  2 mobile networks of di¤erent sizes and one xed network.24
Networks face a given xed cost per subscriber and constant marginal costs for originating
and terminating calls. All networks are interconnected and terminate incoming calls at
prices given by their respective termination rates. We consider imperfect competition in
the mobile market, with consumers perceiving mobile networks as providing substitutable,
horizontally di¤erentiated services in a generalized Hotelling fashion, as described below.
Consumers perceive xed and mobile networks as providing non-substitutable services,
however, so there is no strategic competition between xed and mobile networks.
Each mobile networks subscriber market share is denoted by i > 0, i = 1; :::; n; withPn
i=1 i = 1. Mobile network i incurs a yearly xed cost per customer of fi, and has on-net
costs of cii = coi + cti per call minute, where the indices o and t stand for origination and
termination, respectively. The mobile termination rate (MTR) on network i is denoted ai,
so the per-minute cost of an o¤-net call from network i to network j 6= i is cij = coi + aj.
The xed networks termination rate (FTR) af is slightly above ctf , the cost of call
termination on the xed network. Hence the cost of a call from mobile network i to
the xed network is cif = coi + af . The average cost of a call from the xed to the
mobile networks is cfm = cof + a, where a =
Pn
i=1 iai is the market-share weighted
average MTR. On the xed network, we only consider calls between the xed and mobile
networks and neglect other services , including on-net xed calls.
Tari¤s: Mobile networks o¤er their retail customers a bundleof mobile access, on-net
calls, and o¤-net calls to other mobile networks and to the xed network. Each mobile
network i charges its subscribers an annual subscription fee Fi,25 and per-minute call
prices of pii for on-net calls and pij for o¤-net calls to network j 6= i. We assume that
mobile networks charge uniform o¤-net prices to other mobile networks, i.e. pij = pik for
j; k 6= i. The price of calls to the xed network is denoted pif . We do not consider other
services o¤ered by mobile networks, such as international calls, SMS and data services,
as their interaction with mobile voice calls is not clear and is likely to evolve over time.26
The xed network charges a per-minute price pfm, which we assume to be the monopoly
price over a total marginal cost of cfo + a. This assumption is conservative for our pur-
24There are a number of xed-line networks in the UK, including BT, Virgin Media and Cable and
Wireless. BTs share of subscribers in 2008 exceeded 60% (Ofcom 2009b, Table 2). We assume a single
xed-line network here, which sets FTM prices as described immediately below.
25Yearly subscription fees are used without loss of generality in order to simplify notation and because
the time frame under consideration is one calendar year.
26Ofcom (2007, A19:16) assumes that the corresponding cross-elasticities of demand are small.
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poses because it implies that only half of any decrease in MTRs is passed through to the
FTM call price.27
Consumers: We assume a xed number ofM subscribers in the mobile market, and N
subscribers on the xed network. Each consumer makes calls to all potential recipients on
the xed and mobile networks with equal probability, so in the absence of price di¤erentials
we would have a balanced calling pattern. The demand for calls di¤ers between subscribers
on mobile networks and on the xed network, however.
Subscribers receive a xed utility Ai from being connected to network i;28 utility from
making calls, as a function of call length and the number of calls made; and utility from
receiving calls independently of their origin (so there is a call externality). Specically,
the utility derived from making or receiving a call of length q is u(q) or u(q), respectively,
where 0    1 measures the strength of the call externality. Given a per-minute price p,
consumers demand calls of length q(p), with the resulting surplus of v(p) = u(q(p)) pq(p)
and q(p) =  v0(p). In the following we will simplify notation by denoting qij = q(pij),
uij = u(qij), vij = v(pij) etc.
A single consumers surplus from a given tari¤ is the sum of the net utility from making
and receiving calls minus the subscription fee. Consumers make their choice of network
based the net surplus resulting from their own personal preferences for specic networks
and the tari¤s on o¤er. A client of network i obtains the following surplus, before taking
network preferences into account:
wi = M
nX
j=1
j(vij + uji) +N(vif + ufi)  Fi
= M
nX
j=1
jhij +Nhif   Fi;
where hij = (vij +uji) and hif = (vif +ufi). In matrix notation, this can be written as
w =Mh +Nhf   F;
where we have introduced the matrix h = (hij)nn and the vectors w = (wi)n1,  =
(i)n1, hf = (hif )n1 and F = (Fi)n1.
27Ofcom (2007, A19.26) assumes that the FTM price involves a xed retention above cost. This would
imply a larger pass-through of 1 and larger increases in welfare due to lower MTRs.
28Only the pairwise di¤erences Ai Aj count and can be calibrated, therefore we normalizeminiAi = 0.
This normalization does not a¤ect the comparison between scenarios presented below.
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Network preferences, market shares and consumer surplus: We assume that
consumers consider mobile networks as o¤ering di¤erentiated products in Hotelling (1929)
fashion, generalized to n rms as in Hoernig (2010), and allowing for asymmetric customer
valuations as in Carter and Wright (1999). Each network is located at one of n nodes,
each of which is connected by a Hotelling line to all other nodes. Consumers are uniformly
distributed over these n(n 1)=2 lines. This model of preferences was chosen so that each
network competes directly with every other network for consumers (because there is a line
of consumers connecting every two networks), in contrast to the well-known Salop model
where each rms competes directly only with two other rms.
Assuming a line length of 2=[n(n 1)] and rms i and j at the endpoints, the consumer
at location xij will be indi¤erent between networks i and j if
wi + Ai   txij = wj + Aj   t

2
n(n  1)   xij

;
where t > 0 indicates the strength of horizontal preferences. Thus his location is given by
xij =
1
n(n  1) +
1
2t
(wi + Ai   wj   Aj):
Network is market share is
i =
X
j 6=i
xij = 0i + 
X
j 6=i
(wi   wj);
where  = 1=(2t), and 0i = 1=n+
P
j 6=i(Ai Aj) captures the ex-ante asymmetries due
to consumersvaluations of di¤erent networks.29 Letting B = (bij)nn, with bii = n   1
and bij =  1 for j 6= i, we obtain
 = 0 + Bw = 0 + B (Mh +Nhf   F ) ;
which can be rewritten as
 = G0 + H (Nhf   F ) ; (1)
where G = (I   MBh) 1 and H = GB = (Hij)nn. In the presence of call externalities,
this is still an implicit condition for market shares, since for  > 0 both G and H depend
indirectly on  through o¤-net prices.
29Existence and stability of equilibrium require that networks be su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, or that 
is not too large. See Hoernig (2010).
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Letting A = (Ai)n1, aggregate consumer surplus on mobile networks, including trans-
port cost, is given by
S = M0 (w + A) M
nX
i=1
X
j 6=i
Z xij
0
tzdz
= M0 (w + A)  M
4
nX
i=1
X
j 6=i
x2ij:
Consumer surplus in the xed telephony market (FTM and MTF calls) is
Sf = NM
nX
i=1
i(vfi + uif ) = NM
0gf ;
where gfi = vfi + uif and gf = (gfi)n1.
Prots and welfare: Network is prots are given by
i =Mi
 
M
nX
j=1
jRij +NQi + Fi   fi
!
;
where Rii = (pii   cii)qii for on-net calls and Rij = (pij   cij)qij + (ai   cti)qji for o¤-net
calls to and from other mobile networks. Furthermore, Qi = (pif   cif )qif + (ai   cti)qfi
are the prots from MTF calls and FTM termination. Joint prots of all mobile networks
can be written as
 =M0(MR +NQ+ F   f);
where R = (Rij)nn, Q = (Qi)n1 and f = (fi)n1.
The prots of the xed network from FTM calls are
f = NM
nX
i=1
i(pfm   cfo   ai)qfm = NM(pfm   cfo   a)qfm:
Total welfare is then
W = S + Sf ++ f :
3.2 Pre-Merger Equilibrium
We model the imperfectly competitive market outcomes as Nash equilibria in multi-part
tari¤s, i.e. the outcomes that result from mobile networks o¤ering tari¤s such that no
single network would like to change its o¤er given the other o¤ers. These equilibrium
outcomes determine call prices, subscription fees, the resulting consumer surplus and
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network prots. In the following we will the state equilibrium prices and xed fees. The
corresponding derivations for the pre- and post-merger cases can be found in Annex A.
In equilibrium, rms charge the following call prices:
pii =
cii
1 + 
; pif = cif ; pij =
P
l 6=i lcil
1  (1 + )i
; j 6= i: (2)
That is, as usual e¢ cient on-net prices are set below cost in order to internalize the call
externality; MTF prices are set at cost; and o¤-net prices are set on the basis of perceived
o¤-net cost. These o¤-net prices increase with network size and the strength of the call
externality.
Firm is equilibrium xed fee is
Fi = fi  NQi +M
nX
j=1
j

R̂ij  Rij

; (3)
where
R̂ii =
1
MHii
 
nX
j=1
Hji
Hii
Rij; R̂ij = 0 8 j 6= i:
Finally, with R̂ = (R̂ij)nn, the equilibrium xed fees can be written as
F = f  NQ+M(R̂ R);
which, after substitution into (1), nally gives rise to the equilibrium condition on market
shares
[I   MB(h+R  R̂)] = 0 + B[N(hf +Q)  f ]:
In the presence of call externalities the left-hand side depends on  also through h; R;and
R̂ and thus this condition must be solved numerically.
Finally, after substitution of the equilibrium xed fees the sum of equilibrium prots
in the mobile market can be written as
 =M20R̂:
3.3 Post-Merger Equilibrium
We model the merger of two networks by assuming that their brands (or locations in
consumerspreference space) are kept while their pricing is determined by a unique prot-
maximizing entity. On the one hand, this approach is realistic as long as the merged rm
keeps the two brands, and on the other it maintains consumerspreference space, ensuring
that pre- and post-merger outcomes can be meaningfully compared.
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After the merger, non-merged rms j maximize their prots j, while the rm resulting
from the merger of rms i and k maximizes the sum of prots i+k. In equilibrium, non-
merged rms continue to set equilibrium call prices as in (2). The merged rm charges
the same on-net and MTF prices as before, but di¤erent o¤-net prices:
pik =
coi + ctk
1 + 
; pij =
P
l 6=i;k lcil
1  (1 + ) (i + k)
; j 6= i; k:
Thus the merged brands charge the e¢ cient price for calls to each other, while they set
higher o¤-net call prices to other networks based on the joint market share (rather than
individual market shares).
As concerns xed fees in the post-merger equilibrium, they continue to be given by the
expression in (3) for the non-merged rms. Note, though, that the equilibrium market
shares and call prices have changed and thus the latter xed fees will di¤er from the
pre-merger values. In fact, they will be higher due to unilateral e¤ects. As for the merged
rms i; k, we have
R̂ii =
Hkk
M
 
Pn
j=1 (HkkHji  HkiHjk)Rij
HiiHkk  HkiHik
;
R̂ik =  
Hki
M
+
Pn
j=1 (HkkHji  HkiHjk)Rkj
HiiHkk  HkiHik
;
and R̂ij = R̂ji = 0 for all j 6= i; k. The fact that R̂ik 6= 0 for the merged rms translates
the internalization of the competitive externality that the choice of xed fee Fi imposes on
network k. This internalization is the primary consequence of the joint setting of prices
on both merged rms: Fixed fees will be set higher because there is no point in stealing
either brands clients. All further expressions for market shares and prots are as above
in the pre-merger case.
4 Model Calibration
The model described in Section 3 has been calibrated with data from Ofcoms Communi-
cations Market 2011 report (Ofcom 2011c, Chapter 5) unless indicated otherwise, where
CMx indicates Ofcoms gure numbered 5:x.30 This report contains the data for 2010,
the rst calender year after the merger of Orange and T-Mobile. As we describe in detail
immediately below, the model has been calibrated to observed network costs, subscriber
30These data are available in Excel format at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr11/
UK_all_telecoms_data.csv (consulted on March 31st, 2012).
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numbers, market shares, call quantities and total revenues. The calibration then follows
several successive steps, deriving: 1) demand parameters; 2) horizontal di¤erentiation
parameters; and nally 3) preference asymmetry parameters. It takes explicitly into ac-
count that both Orange and T-Mobile are controlled by the same owner while remaining
separate brands.
The parameter measuring the strength of call externalities ( in our nomenclature)
cannot be derived from the data, hence is varied between ve levels, from zero (i.e. no
call externalities) to the maximal value of 1 (i.e. the receiving party receives the same
utility as the sending party). Arguably, a value of at least 0.5 is realistic, even if we
allow for some internalizationof call externalities between individuals in stable calling
relationships with one another.31 All other parameters have been calibrated for each
specic value of the call externality .
All values are given in 2010 prices, as these correspond to the scaling of the available
data.
Costs on mobile and xed networks: We assume a long-run marginal or incre-
mental cost of originating and terminating calls on mobile networks of 0.75 ppm in 2010
prices, corresponding to Ofcoms estimate of pure LRICof 0.72ppm in 2008/09 prices.32
Marginal costs of origination and termination on the xed network are taken from Of-
com (2009c, Table A2.10) which reports termination costs of 0.198 ppm and origination
costs of 0.212 ppm. We assume an average level for BTs regulated termination charge
of 0.21 ppm,33 and use the 2010 mobile termination rates of 4.35 ppm for Vodafone, O2,
Everything Everywhere (Orange and T-Mobile), and 4.66 ppm for H3G for the calibration
(4.18ppm and 4.48ppm in 2008/09 prices).
Ofcom (2007, A19:18) assumes xed costs per mobile subscriber of £ 95.38 per year.
We allow for no exogenous xed costs in our model since we only wish to include the
avoidable per subscriber costs faced by networks, which are largely composed of handset
subsidies. The value of the latter is determined by the level of xed fees in our model,
31See Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) for a discussion. As we relate below in Section 6, a value of about
0.75 makes simulated pre-merger market shares t quite well with observed 2009 values. While this seems
a reasonable estimate, more evidence is needed to claim that  takes on a specic value.
32Prices have been adjusted to 2010 values using the RPI data available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
datasets-and-tables/data-selector.html? cdid=CHAW&dataset=mm23& table-id=2.1, averaged over the
corresponding calender or business (April to May) year.
33Ofcom (2009a), Paragraph 2.18, states: Wholesale FCT charges are currently no more than 0.25
pence per minute. BTs actual FCT charges vary by time of day. The average charges are currently
between 0.17ppm and 0.25ppm depending on the point of interconnection and the extent of conveyance
(eg single/double tandem). Our assumed average charge of 0.21 ppm is simply the midpoint between
these two gures.
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which are themselves a function of the intensity of competition between the networks,
and hence the levels of the MTRs. In order to avoid this endogeneity problem we assume
that exogenous per-customer xed costs are zero.34
Subscriber market shares: Mobile subscriptions by network operator for 2010 have
been taken from CM54. These result in the subscriber market shares specied in Table
4.1 below. The total number of mobile subscribers in 2010 was 81.165 million (CM16).
After the merger that occurred at the beginning of 2010, Orange and T-Mobile continued
to function as separate brands under its joint owner Everything Everywhere. Therefore
we assume prices for both are set jointly, while consumers continue to perceive them as
separate brands.
Table 4.1 Subscribers and Market Shares, 2010
H3G Vodafone O235 Orange T-Mobile36
Subscribers (m) 5.55 20.08 24.28 31.2037
Market Shares (%) 6.84 24.76 29.93 19.40 19.07
The mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), such as Virgin Mobile and Tesco
Mobile, are not included as independent rms in our analysis. Tesco Mobile is a 50/50
joint venture between Telefonica O2 UK and Tesco plc, and hence acts as a retail arm
of O2. Virgin Mobile was originally formed as a joint venture between T-Mobile and
the Virgin Group, however in January 2004 the Virgin Group bought out T-Mobile and
subsequently became part of the Virgin Media Group in 2006.38
Utility and demand parameters: For each value of the call externality parameter ,
we used the marginal costs and market shares reported above to compute predicted call
prices from (2). We have then calibrated linear demand functions q(p) = a bp for mobile-
to-mobile (MTM) calls by matching these predicted prices with the observed demand of
Q = 82; 602 million MTM call minutes per year (CM51) from M = 81:165 million mobile
network subscribers; assumed demand elasticities; and using the models predictions of
the relative proportions of on-net and o¤-net calls. For better readability these demand
parameters are scaled in terms of call minutes to one million other subscribers.
34Any truly exogenous xed cost per customer does not a¤ect our welfare and prot comparisons since
it would cancel out when di¤erences are taken.
35Includes up to 2.5m Tesco Mobile subscribers.
36Includes about 4m Virgin Mobile subscribers.
37Ofcom only reports the joint subscriber number. We have attributed subscribers proportional to
2009 values.
38See http://about.virginmobile.com/aboutus/about/history.
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Setting Q equal to total predicted MTM call minutes, we have
Q =M2
5X
i;j=1
ij (a  bpij) =M2 (a  b~p) ;
with the average price ~p =
P5
i;j=1 ijpij. The market price elasticity of demand is
" =  M
2~pb
Q
:
Combining both expressions, we nd
a =
1
M2
(1  ")Q; b =   "Q
M2~p
;
where the latter depends on  through the average price ~p.
We assume an elasticity of demand for mobile-originated calls of " =  0:5. This value
is consistent with estimates found in the recent literature and with those presented to the
UK Competition Commission in 2003.39
We obtain a = 18:81 and the following values of the demand slope depending on the
strength of the call externality:
Table 4.2 Demand slope for MTM calls
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
b 1:46 1:36 1:23 1:06 0:86
The demand parameters for mobile-to-xed calls were calibrated similarly, from the
same elasticity, N = 33:404 million subscribers on the xed network (CM1), and a total
demand of 31,999 million MTF minutes (CM51). This results in amf = 17:7 and bmf =
6:15.40
Subscribers on the xed network demanded 11,852 million FTM call minutes per year
(CM42), with a corresponding revenue of £ 1,528m (CM39).41 Under the conservative
39Dewenter and Haucap (2007) have estimated demand elasticities for mobile-originated calls in Austria.
They nd rm-specic short-run elasticities between -0.26 and -0.40, and long-run elasticities between
-0.46 and -1.1. Various estimates of demand elasticities for mobile-originated and xed-to-mobile calls
were presented to the UK Competition Commissions calls to mobilesinquiry in 2003 (see Competition
Commission, 2003, Table 8.7). These ranged from -0.48 to -0.8 for mobile-originated calls, and from
-0.08 to -0.63 for xed-to-mobile calls. Jerry Hausman submitted estimates for the own-price elasticity of
mobile-originated calls of between 0.5 to 0.6 for the USA. Ofcom (2007) stated that a reasonable range
for the own-price elasticities was between 0.2 and 0.4 for both mobile-originated and xed-to-mobile
calls, and used the value -0.3 (Figure A19.2).
40The values of the demand parameters for MTF calls actually have no e¤ect at all on our results since
the price and quantity of these calls remain the same in all scenarios. We present their calibration here
for completeness only.
41This gure does not include any subscription revenues.
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assumption that the xed network sets a separate prot-maximizing price for FTM calls,
i.e. chooses the monopoly price given the underlying cost of origination on the xed
network and termination on mobile networks, the linear demand function calibrated on
FTM call minutes leads to the demand parameters afm = 11:16 and bfm = 0:53.
Horizontal di¤erentiation parameter: For a given call externality  and the re-
sulting demand parameters, we have calibrated the di¤erentiation parameter  of the
underlying Hotelling model such that the total revenue from mobile subscriptions and
metered calls is equal to £ 10,547m (CM47). Total revenue is given by
Revenue =M
5X
i=1
i
 
M
5X
j=1
jpijqij +Npmfiqmfi + Fi
!
;
where the calibration uses the post-merger expressions for equilibrium xed fees to deter-
mine . These xed fees take into account that they are set on a joint basis for Orange
and T-mobile.
Since revenues depend nonlinearly on  this condition is solved numerically.
Table 4.3 Di¤erentiation parameter
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
 0.000543 0.000530 0.000510 0.000480 0.000427
stab 0.004834 0.002824 0.001834 0.001213 0.000762
Calibrated values for  have always been found in the stable range, i.e.  < stab,
where the latter has been determined as indicated in Hoernig (2010).42
Asymmetry parameters: Finally, given  the network asymmetry parameters have
been determined, up to an arbitrary normalization which we choose to be miniAi = 0.
That is, each Ai represents the additional amount per year that a subscriber would be
willing to pay for switching to rm i, as compared to the rm with the lowest valuation,
if all tari¤s were identical.
Letting E be the (5 1)-vector of ones, we have 0 = E=5 + BA, or
BA =
1

(0   E=5) =
1

(  E=5) Bw:
42This check for stability in expectations is essentially a consistency check, but without further im-
plications concerning the derivation or interpretation of our results given that is has been passed. We
report it here for completeness only.
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The only unknown at this stage is A, but it cannot be determined directly because B has
less than full rank. Letting A = ~A  E~a0 where E 0 ~A = 0 and ~a0 = min ~A, we have
BA = (5I   EE 0)

~A  E~a0

= 5E~a0   5E~a0 + 5 ~A  EE 0 ~A = 5 ~A:
Thus ~A = BA=5, from which the asymmetry parameters A can be determined as follows:
Table 4.4 Asymmetry parameters (£ per year relative to H3G)
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Vodafone 147 147 149 153 164
O2 188 188 190 194 206
Orange 142 141 139 135 129
T-Mobile 140 139 137 133 126
With these asymmetry parameters the model replicates the 2010 (post-merger) market
shares reported in Table 4.1.
5 The E¤ects of Reducing MTRs
Section 5.1 reports our model predictions. Section 5.2 discusses these results and considers
some longer-run implications of reducing MTRs.
5.1 Model Predictions
This section reports the predictions of our calibrated model for call externality parameters
 of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1, respectively. All results are reported in £ million per calendar
year in 2010 prices. Increases of the variables under consideration, as compared to the
base scenario are given by positive values and decreases by negative values.
In our base scenario, mobile networkstermination rates are set at Ofcoms LRIC+
levels for 2010. These were 4.66 ppm for H3G and 4.35 ppm for the four other mobile
operators, in 2010 prices. This base scenario is compared with three other scenarios with
MTRs reduced to: (i) Ofcoms current estimate of pure LRIC; (ii) the average price of
termination on the xed network; and (iii) zero, i.e. Bill & Keep.
As noted above, equilibrium market shares are determined endogenously in our model.
Since they only change marginally compared to their original 2010 values we do not report
them here.
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Aggregate e¤ects: As shown in Table 5.1, total welfare, i.e. the sum of social welfare
in the mobile and the xed markets, increases signicantly under all three alternative
scenarios for reducing MTRs. The extent of the increase depends upon the size of the call
externality parameter, and exceeds £ 3 billion per year when receiver benets are large
(i.e.  > 0:75).
Table 5.1 Change in Welfare Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC 992 1432 1998 2807 4214
Reciprocal with Fixed 1075 1543 2144 2996 4454
Bill & Keep 1104 1580 2190 3055 4527
When  = 0 (no call externalities), the increase in aggregate welfare is caused by
aligning MTRs more closely to marginal costs, since above-cost MTRs distort call prices
upwards and call quantities downwards. In the absence of a xed network, LRIC-based
pricing would always result in the highest welfare increase, since MTM calls are priced
at true network cost. Since FTM calls are priced above cost, however, total welfare
is further increased as MTRs are reduced below pure LRIC since this reduces the
monopoly pricing distortion in FTM calls.
When call externalities matter, welfare-maximizing MTRs are always below marginal
cost for two reasons. First, in the absence of strategic e¤ects, below-cost MTRs induce
networks to internalizecall externalities by setting o¤-net prices below cost. Second,
since call externalities create strategic incentives for mobile rms to increase their o¤-net
prices, reducing MTRs below marginal cost mitigates this e¤ect, which is particularly
strong on the merged networks.43 Hence Bill & Keep increasingly dominates LRIC in
welfare terms as we increase  from zero to one.
As discussed in more detail in Section 5.2, lowering MTRs reduces network e¤ects and
relaxes price competition in the mobile market. This can result in lower levels of mobile
consumer surplus for small values of . Consumer surplus in the xed market always
increases, however, due to the reduction in the FTM call price. We nd that in the UK
market the latter e¤ect dominates and aggregate consumer surplus increases. For large
values of  it increases by more than £ 1.2 billion in every scenario (see Table 5.2).
43See Armstrong and Wright (2009b), Berger (2004) (2005), Hoernig (2008), and Harbord and Pagnozzi
(2010).
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Table 5.2 Change in Consumer Surplus Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC 228 513 825 1177 1540
Reciprocal with Fixed 219 517 843 1208 1581
Bill & Keep 212 514 843 1210 1584
Finally, the sum of prots in the xed and mobile markets increases in all scenarios
for any value of  (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Change in Prots Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC 764 919 1173 1631 2673
Reciprocal with Fixed 857 1026 1300 1789 2873
Bill-and-Keep 892 1066 1347 1845 2943
Mobile telephony: We now consider the mobile market in isolation, that is, the e¤ect
of reducing MTRs on consumer surplus, welfare and prots in the mobile market only.
As shown in Table 5.4, welfare increases in the mobile market for all values of .
Table 5.4 Change in Mobile Welfare Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC 278 718 1284 2093 3499
Reciprocal with Fixed 243 710 1311 2164 3622
Bill-and-Keep 224 700 1310 2175 3648
The lower increase in welfare when  = 0 is caused by the reduction in xed-to-mobile
transfers. With higher levels of call externalities, this e¤ect is outweighed by the reduction
in o¤-net call prices and the resulting increase in o¤-net call volumes (i.e. the "o¤-net
pricing e¤ect"), induced by the lower MTRs. With very high call externalities welfare in
the mobile market increases by more than £ 3 billion per annum.
For low values of , consumer surplus the mobile market (see Table 5.5) decreases,
and does so for two reasons. Networksprots per consumer from FTM transfers are
reduced, and lower MTRs reduce tari¤-mediated network e¤ects. Both result in higher
subscription prices via the "waterbed e¤ect" and the reduced intensity of competition
between mobile rms (the "competition e¤ect").
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Table 5.5 Change in Mobile Consumer Surplus Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC -10 275 587 939 1302
Reciprocal with Fixed -59 240 566 930 1304
Bill-and-Keep -81 220 549 916 1291
For higher values of  these e¤ects are outweighed by the o¤-net pricing e¤ect noted
above, and consumer surplus increases whenever   0:25. That is, the additional surplus
created by the reduction in o¤-net call prices is at least partly retained by consumers,
compensating for the countervailing negative e¤ects.44 Still, consumer surplus in the
mobile market is higher under Pure LRIC than under Reciprocity or Bill & Keep.
Mobile networksprots, on the other hand, increase for all values of  (see Table
5.6) due to the competition e¤ect. Reduced FTM transfers do not a¤ect prots since the
waterbed e¤ect is always "full" in our model.
Table 5.6 Change in Mobile Prots Over LRIC+Pricing
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Pure LRIC 288 443 697 1155 2197
Reciprocal with Fixed 301 471 745 1234 2318
Bill-and-Keep 305 480 761 1259 2356
Fixed telephony: Finally, we consider the e¤ects of reducing MTRs on the xed mar-
ket. The model includes prots and consumer surplus from FTM calls, and also consumer
surplus from receiving MTF calls. Fixed termination rates are set close to cost, so there
are almost no termination prots. The estimated values for changes in welfare, consumer
surplus and prots in the xed market do not depend on the size of the call externality,
since the mobile-to-xed price is independent of the level of MTRs.
Welfare in the xed market increases signicantly, for two reasons: First, transfers to
mobile networks are reduced, and second, FTM call quantities are brought closer to their
e¢ cient level.
Table 5.7 Change Over LRIC+Pricing
Welfare Consumer Surplus Prots
Pure LRIC 714 238 476
Reciprocal with Fixed 833 278 555
Bill-and-Keep 880 293 586
Due to the monopoly pricing assumption, the xed network retains most of this welfare
increase in the form of increased prots (see Section 3).
44See Section 5.2 for a more detailed discussion of these e¤ects.
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5.2 E¤ects of Reducing MTRs: Discussion
Our calibrated welfare model provides a rigorous and quantiable approach to assessing
the likely e¤ects of changes in MTRs, taking account of call externalities, calls to and
from the xed network, and a realistic number of rms. Our results show that although
consumer surplus may decrease in the mobile market considered in isolation when MTRs
are reduced, overall welfare, consumer surplus and rmsprots increase in the telecom-
munications market as a whole, for all values of the call externality parameter. Depending
on the strength of call externalities, our model predicts welfare improvements of approxi-
mately £ 1 to £ 4 billion per annum, with Bill & Keep resulting in the greatest increase in
overall welfare. Inclusion of the xed-line operator and call externalities in the analysis
is thus indispensable to assessing the economic e¤ects of reductions in MTRs.
The results of our analysis qualify, or even contradict, some conclusions reached in the
recent literature. We discuss these issues in Section 5.2.1 below. Our model also omits
certain longer-run e¤ects in assuming that the size of the market (i.e. the total number
of mobile subscribers) and the structure of retail prices (i.e. "calling-party-pays") remain
unchanged as MTRs are reduced. We consider these issues in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Short-Run Issues
Waterbed and tari¤-mediated network e¤ects: A number of recent papers have
argued that reductions in MTRs will necessarily reduce consumer surplus, and possibly
welfare, in the mobile market, and for two reasons. First, a xed-to-mobile termina-
tion rate above cost results in a ow of termination prots to mobile networks, some or
all of which is passed on to mobile subscribers via the waterbed e¤ect. Hence mo-
bile subscribers should prefer xed-to-mobile termination rates set at the monopoly (i.e.
prot-maximizing) level. As Armstrong and Wright (2009a, p. F286) put it, high FTM
termination charges are a means of transferring surplus from xed callers to mobile re-
cipients.
Second, mobile subscribers can also benet from above-cost mobile-to-mobile termi-
nation rates, since these make o¤-net calls more expensive than on-net calls, creating
network e¤ects which favour larger networks. This intensies competition between net-
works to attract subscribers, which reduces their equilibrium subscription charges. The
much-cited result is that equilibrium consumer surplus on mobile networks is increasing
in the level of the mobile-to-mobile termination rate (Gans and King, 2001; Armstrong
and Wright, 2009a).45
45This result has led a number of authors to suggest that mobile networks should prefer to agree
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While these arguments have been much aired in recent regulatory debates, they are
subject to a number of important caveats. The argument with respect to xed-to-mobile
termination rates is incomplete in two important respects. First, as observed by Arm-
strong and Wright (2009a, p. F284), even if all xed-line subscribers have a mobile phone,
high termination rates would still create an allocative ine¢ ciency, and hence the gain to
mobile subscribers from low subscription charges is always outweighed by the welfare loss
on the xed network from high xed-to-mobile termination rates. Since most telephone
subscribers use both xed and mobile networks, the increase in economic e¢ ciency and
welfare achieved by aligning MTRs more closely with marginal costs benets telephony
users in general.
Second, the argument loses much of its force when call externalities, or receiver ben-
ets, matter. To see this, note that with call externalities the total surplus created on a
mobile network by a xed-to-mobile call can be written as
sfm = (a  ct)qf + u(qf );
where a is the xed-to-mobile termination rate, ct the marginal cost of termination, and
qf the length of the call. An increase in a above marginal cost increases the prots of the
mobile network, some or all of which is passed on to mobile subscribers via the waterbed
e¤ect, but simultaneously reduces the utility received by the mobile networks subscribers
from xed-to-mobile calls through reducing qf . With a high ratio of receiver to sender
benets (i.e. the call externality parameter in our model), the latter e¤ect outweighs the
former and hence welfare on mobile networks becomes a decreasing function of the level
of MTRs.46 ;47
The argument that above-cost, mobile-to-mobile termination rates benet mobile con-
sumers is also incomplete. As demonstrated by Hoernig (2010), it is only necessarily true
in models with at most two mobile networks. For n  2 symmetric networks and generic
j 6= i, consumer surplus becomes
CS =
n  2
n
(Rij + hij) 
1
n (n  1)hij + const;
where const does not depend on the o¤-net price. Evidently, the rst term only arises
with n > 2 networks. Hoernig then shows that consumer surplus decreases in the o¤-net
on below-cost mobile-to-mobile termination charges, and that such an agreement would harm mobile
subscribers who prefer the more intense competition created by higher MTRs.
46See Armstrong and Wright (2009b) and Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010, Section 5.1) for further discus-
sion.
47A third caveat is of course that the argument for high xed-to-mobile termination rates depends
upon the strength of the waterbed e¤ect, about which we can say little in practice. Some preliminary
results can be found in Genakos and Valletti (forthcoming).
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price if
n > n () =
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:
Demand elasticities " < 1 are su¢ cient for n () to be decreasing in the strength of call
externalities, i.e. if the elasticity of call demand is low then stronger call externalities make
it more likely that consumer surplus decreases with higher o¤-net prices. With n > n
networks, although a reduction in the mobile-to-mobile termination rate still mitigates
network e¤ects, and hence relaxes competition between mobile networks for market share,
the loss in consumer surplus due to fewer o¤-net call minutes dominates.
The upshot is that it is an empirical question whether a reduction in xed-to-mobile
and mobile-to-mobile termination charges will result in an increase or a decrease in welfare
and consumer surplus on mobile networks considered in isolation, especially in markets
with more than two rms. In our calibrated results for the UK market, when call exter-
nalities are not insignicant consumer surplus and welfare increase in both the mobile and
xed markets. Hence, the theoretical trade-o¤between increasing welfare and maintaining
consumer surplus in the mobile market disappears once call externalities and a realistic
number of networks are taken into account.
Fixed-to-mobile substitution: Our welfare model treats xed and mobile networks
as if they operated in entirely separate markets, with no competitive interaction either
at the level of calls or subscriptions. That is, we have not allowed for any substitution
between xed and mobile calls, and nor have we have considered whether changes in
mobile termination rates might a¤ect the overall numbers of subscriptions to xed versus
mobile networks.48
Recent data indicates that subscriptions to xed networks are relatively price inelas-
tic,49 and according to Ofcom (2009d, Fig. 4.62, p.248), more than 80% of all UK house-
holds subscribed to both xed and mobile services in 2009.50 Hence the assumption of no
competitive interaction at the level of access or subscriptions can probably be justied.
Consumers who subscribe to both mobile and xed networks, however, can choose
between the two types of calls, depending on which is cheaper and on whether or not
callers have a xed phone available when they want to place a call. Armstrong and
Wright (2009a, Section 3.3) model this form of FTM substitution by assuming that calls
48In the next section we consider how changes in mobile termination rates might a¤ect the numbers of
subscribers to mobile networks considered in isolation.
49See Briglauer et al. (2011) and Vogelsang (2010).
50This gure fell to 78% in 2010 (see Ofcom 2010b, Fig. 5.67), so a small amount of FTM substitution
at this level may be taking place.
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made on the FTM demand curve can originate on either xed or mobile networks, and
that consumers will always choose the lower-cost form of communication. That is, they
assume that FTM and MTM calls are perfect substitutes and that callers are never on
the move.
In our calibrated model, the FTM price is always above the highest equilibrium o¤-
net price. Thus our results are consistent with the possibility of call substitution between
FTM and MTM calls if we interpret the FTM calls observed in the data as calls made by
customers of the xed network who do not have access to a mobile phone when they place
their call. Thus explicitly modeling FTM substitution would not change our results.
5.2.2 Long-Run E¤ects
Market expansion: Mobile operators in Europe have long argued that high MTRs
result in mobile rms subsidizing connection and acquisition costs for new subscribers,
via the waterbed e¤ect, and that this leads to market expansion which benets new and
existing mobile subscribers. In the presence of such network externalities, socially-optimal
MTRs should therefore exceed marginal costs.51
Armstrong and Wright (2009a) have provided some theoretical support for this policy.
Noting that mobile subscribersutility increases with both the xed-to-mobile and mobile-
to-mobile termination charges in their duopoly model, they suggest that this observation
implies that rms and the regulator can use relatively high termination charges as a means
to expand the number of mobile subscribers.To demonstrate this formally, they consider
a Hotelling model with hinterlands in which the total number of mobile subscribers
is increasing in the utility they derive from joining one or other of the mobile networks.
The possibility of market expansion introduces market-level network e¤ects: when a new
subscriber joins a network, the utility of the existing subscribers to any network increases
since there are now more subscribers they can call, either on-net or o¤-net. Armstrong
and Wright (2009a) conclude that socially optimal MTRs should exceed the marginal cost
of termination, and that the xed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile rates should be set at
di¤erent levels, if feasible.52
51Since the Competition Commissions 2003 inquiry, mobile operators in the UK have received (and
paid) a network externality surchargeon top of their regulated MTRs for this purpose. See Competition
Commission (2003, pp. 225-252). In its 2008/09 inquiry, the Competition Commission revisited the issue
and decided that a network externality surcharge was no longer justied (see Competition Commission,
2009, Section 4). Network externality surcharges have also been applied in Belgium, Greece, Italy and
Sweden (Cullen International, 2008), although the European Commission (EC, 2009b) now recommends
against this policy.
52Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002) and Valletti and Houpis (2005) also found that the welfare-
maximizing xed-to-mobile termination charge is above cost when there is scope for market expansion.
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As discussed immediately above, these conclusions do not necessarily survive an in-
crease in the number of competing mobile networks and the inclusion of call externalities
in the analysis. In mobile markets with more than two rms, mobile subscribersconsumer
surplus is not necessarily increasing in the mobile-to-mobile termination rate. Indeed, our
results show that if a realistic number of networks is taken into account, then mobile
consumer surplus may actually be decreasing in the termination rate, in particular if call
externalities are signicant.
Furthermore, when call externalities matter, a high xed-to-mobile termination rate
does not necessarily increase the surplus of mobile subscribers via the "waterbed e¤ect"
since fewer xed-to-mobile call minutes will the received by mobile customers. Whether
xed-to-mobile termination rates can be used to increase mobile take-up is therefore an
empirical question, which depends upon the strength of call externalities and other market
parameters, such as the elasticity of demand for xed-to-mobile calls.
Further doubt is cast on the market expansion argument by evidence on mobile sub-
scription or penetration rates in Bill & Keep countries versus calling party network
pays(CPNP) countries with higher MTRs. Recent studies undertaken for Ofcom (Of-
com 2009a, Annexes 5 and 7) nd that once data on mobile take-up rates are corrected
for multiple subscriptions, which are more common in CPNP countries, there is little
measurable di¤erence in penetration rates between Bill & Keep and CPNP countries (see
also Analysys Mason, 2008, pp. 7-10). While mobile usage, or call volumes, tend to be
much higher in Bill & Keep countries, mobile subscription levels do not appear to depend
on the level of MTRs in mature markets.53
It is therefore unclear whether reducing either xed-to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile
termination rates will result in a decrease or increase in the overall number of mobile
subscribers, and our results reect this ambiguity. When call externalities are neglected,
lower MTRs may reduce consumer surplus in the mobile market which could result in
a long-run reduction in the number of mobile subscribers. If call externalities matter,
on the other hand, then lower MTRs increase mobile-market consumer surplus, and this
should lead to market expansion. By holding the number of mobile subscribers xed, our
model is conservative in the sense that it then likely underestimates (in Table 5.5) either
the decrease or increase in consumer surplus associated with lower termination rates.
These models did not allow for mobile-to-mobile calls, however.
53See also ERG (2009, pp. 22-26), which concludes that there is no strong correlation between pene-
tration (or ownership) rates and MTRs.
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Receiving party pays: Finally, reducing the level of MTRs may a¤ect the types of
tari¤s o¤ered by mobile networks. In most Bill & Keep(or near Bill & Keep) countries
(e.g. Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, the United States), mobile rms have adopted
receiving party pays (RPP), i.e. customers are "charged" for receiving calls. In many
cases this simply implies that both calls made and received are bundled into a monthly
"bucket" of free minutes. Cambini and Valletti (2008) and Lopez (2011) argue networks
may adopt RPP when MTRs are reduced below cost.54 So would the reductions in MTRs
considered in this paper lead to reception charges for mobile subscribers, and would this
increase or decrease economic e¢ ciency and social welfare?
The literature on this subject is still in its infancy, so no denite answer can be
given. Jeon et al. (2004, pp. 105-107) analyze duopoly competition with network-based
price discrimination and reception charges and show that for  < 1; in any symmetric
equilibrium o¤-net reception charges are either innite or equal to ct   a depending on
parameter values. For reasonable parameter values, Bill & Keep can lead to reception
charges so high that no o¤-net calls are made. Hermalin and Katz (2009), on the other
hand, consider a model in which the strategic motive for increasing o¤-net prices is absent,
implying that networks always set o¤-net sender and receiver prices equal to perceived
marginal cost, c0+a and ct a; respectively. Thus if Bill & Keep were adopted (a = 0), the
total cost of an o¤-net call would be divided between the sender and receiver in proportion
to the costs incurred on each network. The two models therefore lead to strikingly di¤erent
predictions concerning prot-maximizing sender and receiver charges for given termination
charges, and Hermalin and Katz (2009, p. 30) remark that, the importance of such cross-
carrier e¤ects is an empirical question that remains to be answered.55
Whatever the theoretical predictions, as noted by Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010, Section
6), existing empirical evidence suggests that mobile networks in Bill & Keep countries do
not set very high reception charges. Ofcom (2009a, Annex 9) presents evidence on sender
versus reception charges in the United States, and nds that all operators for all levels
of output charge the same price for both types of calls.Analysys Mason (2008) found
that while all Bill & Keep countries have RPP retail charging regimes, there exist free
54See also EC (2009b, p. 31). In the ECs view, RPP may evolve after a reduction of the regulated
termination charge or as a response to a Bill and Keep system. Ofcom (2009a, p. 38), however, views
this as highly unlikely, given the likely consumer reaction.
55Lopez (2011) obtains results which are broadly consistent with those of Jeon et al. (2004). He nds
that connectivity breakdown is prone to occur when networks distinguish between on-net and o¤-net call
and reception charges. Cambini and Valletti (2008), on the other hand, nd that networksincentives to
use o¤-net/on-net price discrimination to induce connectivity breakdown are reduced when outgoing and
incoming calls are complements (specically, in a model in which each outgoing o¤-net call results in a
fraction x < 1 of incoming calls).
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incoming call plans in each of these jurisdictions, whose relative importance appears to
increase over time (p.4). Hence, as an empirical matter, it is unclear that the adoption of
Bill & Keep would necessarily lead to the imposition of signicant reception charges for
mobile calls.
6 Analysis of the Orange/T-Mobile Merger
Another application of our model is to analyze the merger between Orange and T-Mobile
in the UK mobile market, approved by the European Commission in 2010. The two
operators merged in May 2010 to form a new company called Everything Everywhere
Ltd, which, based on end of 2009 data, had a combined market share of more than 40% of
UK mobile subscribers (a total of 34.1 million, including MVNOs such as Virgin Mobile).
Our calibrated welfare model allows us to estimate the mergers unilateral e¤ects on
economic e¢ ciency, consumer welfare and mobile rmsprots.
The computational simulation of welfare e¤ects of real-world (proposed) horizontal
mergers in oligopolistic markets has become an increasingly important instrument of
competition policy since the mid-1990s, both in the U.S. and in the EU. Merger sim-
ulation models (MSMs) have been employed by antitrust authorities, merging companies
and courts to assess the pro- or anticompetitive e¤ects of proposed mergers. Like other
merger simulations, we use a standard oligopoly model calibrated to observed prices and
quantities to predict the e¤ects of the Orange/T-Mobile merger on the prices and quan-
tities of the merging rms and their rivals (see Froeb and Werden 2000, Budzinski 2009,
Budzinski and Ruhmer 2010). Contrary to these papers, however, we have based our
calibration on post-merger outcomes, and simulate what the market would have looked
like in 2010 if the merger had not occurred.
As described in detail in Section 3, we capture the e¤ects of the merger by assuming
that Orange and T-Mobile maintain their separate identities, or "brands", but jointly
decide on their prot-maximizing call prices and subscription charges.56 This means
that the number of brands and the consumer preference space remain unchanged in the
Hotelling model before and after the merger. Thus welfare and market outcomes pre- and
post-merger can be consistently compared.
We analyze the merger under di¤erent assumptions concerning the level of MTRs.
First, mobile networksMTRs are set equal to the 2010 values set by Ofcom, i.e. those
56This is the relevant case, since the companies had announced that the T-Mobile and Orange brands
would continue to operate in the UK for at least 18 months following the merger (see Ofcom 2010a, p.
320).
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that have been used in the model calibration. Second, we simulate the hypothetical e¤ects
of the merger assuming that MTRs had been reduced zero (i.e. Bill & Keep) already before
to the merger. All reported results are stated in £ million per calendar year in 2010/11
prices.57
6.1 E¤ects of the Merger under 2010/11 MTRs:
We rst consider the changes in mobile rmsmarket shares caused by the merger. In
Table 6.1 we report observed market shares from the last pre-merger year 2009, and for
the rst post-merger year 2010, with simulated pre-merger market shares for 2010 data
under di¤erent assumptions concerning the strength of call externalities.
For all values of the call externality parameter the merger leads to a reduction in the
merging rmsmarket shares, since these rms raise their prices and lose some subscribers.
Comparing simulated 2010 pre-merger market shares to those observed in 2009, the former
match the latter almost perfectly for values of  close to 0.75. This result may yield a
rough indication of the relevant value of the call externality parameter.
Table 6.1 Pre- and Post-merger Market Shares
Post-merger Pre-merger, simulated for 2010 Pre-merger
2010  = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1 2009
H3G 6.8 4.92 5.10 5.46 6.12 7.35 6.1
Vodafone 24.8 22.83 22.88 23.04 23.36 23.94 23.46
O2 29.9 27.99 28.01 28.10 28.29 28.58 27.92
Orange 19.4 22.27 22.14 21.84 21.26 20.21 21.04
T-Mobile 19.1 22.00 21.87 21.56 20.97 19.92 21.41
With MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the welfare e¤ects of the merger
depend on the strength of call externalities (see Table 6.2). In the absence of call exter-
nalities ( = 0), the merger reduces welfare least, as a result of a number of competing
e¤ects. First, by moving more subscribers on to the largest network, the merger improves
welfare by reducing the allocative ine¢ ciency associated with high o¤-net call prices. That
is, subscribers on the merged network benet from being able to make more e¢ ciently-
priced on-net calls. Second, since the merged rms increase their xed charges by more
than other networks, equilibrium market shares increase slightly for the other rms, and
decrease for the merged rm. This means that a fraction of consumers face higher calling
57Increases of the variables under consideration are given by positive values and decreases by negative
values. The point of comparison in all cases is the pre-merger outcome under either level of MTRs (2010
values or Bill & Keep). Consumers on the xed network and the xed network itself are not a¤ected by
the merger, given that MTRs are held xed. Thus all e¤ects are located in the mobile market.
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charges for o¤-net calls on the smaller networks, as well as incurring di¤erent Hotelling
"transport" costs. Finally, there is an additional, small welfare loss resulting from the
fact that a fraction of consumers move on to their least-preferred network H3G (see the
calibrated asymmetry parameters in Table 3.4). The overall e¤ect is a welfare loss of £ 321
million per annum when  = 0.
For  > 0, however, the merged rms increase their o¤-net prices and aggregate welfare
decreases further, with the welfare losses exceeding the cost savings of £ 390 - £ 420 million
per year predicted by the companies themselves when   0:5. Hence for moderate to
high call externalities the merger would appear to be detrimental to economic e¢ ciency,
even if we allow for all of the cost savings posited by the companies.58
Table 6.2 Merger E¤ects with 2010/11 MTRs
Change in  = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Welfare -321 -374 -524 -911 -1933
Consumer Surplus -1284 -1259 -1249 -1283 -1395
Prots 963 885 725 373 -538
Since the merger reduces the intensity of competition between the mobile networks,
it induces them to raise the level of their xed charges, increasing prots at the expense
of consumer surplus. The resulting losses in consumer surplus exceed £ 1.2 billion per
annum for all values of . For low values of  the reductions in consumer surplus are
mirrored by increases in the mobile networksprots, but for higher values equilibrium
prots increase less, or may even decrease, since the merged networkshigher o¤-net prices
intensify competition through tari¤-mediated network e¤ects.
6.2 E¤ects of the Merger with Bill & Keep
If we perform our calculations with much lower MTRs, such as those proposed in the
European Commission Recommendation and recently adopted by Ofcom, the (negative
or positive) e¤ects of the merger on aggregate welfare are much reduced. We model this by
assuming that Bill & Keep is adopted prior to the merger. In this case, the merger would
have reduced welfare by just £ 2 million per year, or may even have increased it by up to
£ 23 million, depending on the value of  (see Table 6.3). If we allow for the companies
claimed cost savings of £ 390 - £ 420 million per year (see Annex B), this means that the
merger would have been welfare improving for all assumed values of the call externality
parameter.
58Our estimate of the mergers expected annual cost savings is based on information provided in Orange
and T-Mobile (2009). The calculations are detailed in Annex B.
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But the merger still would have resulted in large decreases in consumer surplus for all
values of , exceeding £ 900 million per annum for all values of . These reductions in
consumer surplus are closely mirrored by increases in networksprots. Hence even if a
regime of very low MTRs had been adopted prior to the merger, it would have created
signicant welfare losses for consumers and signicant additional prots for mobile rms.
Table 6.3 Merger under Bill & Keep
Change in  = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
Welfare -2 3 8 14 23
Consumer Surplus -913 -909 -909 -918 -959
Prots 912 911 917 932 983
6.3 Discussion
Our analysis shows that with MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the aggregate
e¤ects of the Orange/T-Mobile merger depend on the strength of call externalities. By
moving more subscribers on to a single large network, the merger improves allocative
e¢ ciency and welfare for low values of the call externality parameter if we allow for the
"synergies" or cost savings posited by the merged rms. This observation provides a stark
illustration of the ine¢ ciencies created by the LRIC+ approach to regulating MTRs. In
the absence of call externalities, e¢ ciency and welfare (although not consumer surplus)
would be increased even further by a merger of all ve of the mobile network operators
in the UK market into a single monopoly network, so that all mobile-to-mobile calls
became more e¢ ciently-priced on-net calls. When receiver benets matter, this is result
is reversed, so there is a critical level of the call externality parameter for which the merger
becomes harmful to allocative e¢ ciency.
With much lower MTRs, such as Bill & Keep, the mergers aggregate e¤ects on welfare
and e¢ ciency are much reduced, since o¤-net call prices are much closer to their e¢ cient
level. Nevertheless, the merger signicantly reduces competition and consumer surplus in
each of the scenarios we have considered. Under the 2010/11 levels of regulated MTRs,
these losses are exceed £ 1.2 billion per annum for all values of . Under Bill & Keep, the
consumer surplus losses still exceed £ 900 million per annum.
The European Commission approved the merger, subject to certain undertakings
agreed by the companies relating to network-sharing arrangements and divestiture of
spectrum (see EC, 2010). It is not obvious how these undertakings addressed the compe-
tition and welfare-related concerns illustrated by our calibrated model, however.
Our model could obviously also be used to analyze the e¤ects of other mobile mergers
such as the recently abandoned acquisition of T-Mobile in the United States by AT&T,
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or a potential merger between T-Mobile and Sprint.
7 Conclusions
The traditional approach to regulating mobile termination rates in Europe (based on
fully-allocated or long-run incremental cost plus), resulted in regulated MTRs an or-
der of magnitude above reasonable estimates of long-run incremental costs on mobile
networks, which in turn are much closer to marginal cost. In the presence of call exter-
nalities, e¢ cient pricing on mobile networks requires MTRs below marginal cost. The
European Commissions 2009 Recommendation represented a radical shift in regulatory
policy, which may ultimately lead to the abolition of MTRs altogether. While the re-
cent theoretical literature provides some qualitative support for this change in policy, in
this paper we have provided a quantiable approach to assessing the e¤ects of signicant
reductions in MTRs in the UK mobile market, and elsewhere.
We show that reducing MTRs broadly in line with the European Commissions rec-
ommendation increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networksprots in the UK
xed and mobile telephony markets. Depending on the strength of call externalities,
social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year. In addi-
tion, contrary to claims made in the recent literature, our results conrm that reducing
MTRs can also benet mobile subscribers considered in isolation, especially when call
externalities are signicant. Our welfare analysis thus lends support to a move away
from fully-allocated cost pricing and towards much lower MTRs, with Bill & Keep often
resulting in the largest increase in overall welfare.
We have also analyzed the likely e¤ects of the merger between Orange and T-Mobile
and shown that its overall e¤ect on welfare depends on the strength of call externalities,
with MTRs set at the their 2010 levels. A prior adoption of Bill &-Keep might have
ameliorated these aggregate welfare e¤ects, although serious concerns about the mergers
negative impact on consumers remain. The undertakings agreed between the companies
and the European Commission did not appear to address these concerns.
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Annex A Equilibrium Pre- and Post-Merger Outcomes
Call prices: In order to determine call prices, we follow the standard technique of
nding the optimal pricing structure while holding market shares constant through an
appropriate adjustment of the xed fee. The equilibrium market shares will then be
determined in a second step. This procedure is without loss of generality but simplies
the derivation of call prices.
Given uniform o¤-net prices, a non-merged rm i chooses the three prices pii, pij and
pif , while holding
P
j 6=i(wi   wj) constant by adapting Fi. Thus, using dvij=dpij =  qij
and duij=dpij = pijq0ij, we have
dFi
dpii
= Mi(piiq
0
ii   qii);
dFi
dpif
=  Nqif ;
dFi
dpij
=  M [(1  i) qij + ipijq0ij]:
Thus rm is rst-order conditions on prot-maximization become (cij =
P
l 6=i lcil= (1  i)
is the average o¤-net cost)
0 =
di
dpii
=M22i (qii + (pii   cii) + piiq0ii   qii) ;
0 =
di
dpij
=M2i (1  i)

qij + (pij   cij)q0ij   qij  
i
1  i
pijq
0
ij

;
0 =
di
dpif
=MNi
 
qif + (pif   cif )q0if   qif

:
The resulting call prices are
pii =
cii
1 + 
; pif = cif ;
pij =
P
l 6=i lcil
1  (1 + )i
; j 6= i:
The two merged rms (let us call them 1 and 2, and the merged network have market
share 1+2 = 1+2), when maximizing joint prots 1+2, will set the on-net prices pii
and FTM price pif above, thus we only have to determine the prices p12, p21 and o¤-net
prices pij (j  3). While it seems intuitive that calls between the two merged networks
should be priced at on-net level, and o¤-net prices based on the joint market share, we will
present the corresponding derivations because they are non-trivial. The merged network
chooses its prices p12 and p1j while adjusting F1 and F2 as to keep
P
j 6=1(w1   wj) andP
j 6=2(w2   wj) constant (the determination of p21 and p2j follows the same logic). Thus
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for calls between networks 1 and 2,
  (n  1)

M2q12 +
dF1
dp12

 M1p12q012 +
dF2
dp12
= 0
(n  1)

M1p12q
0
12  
dF2
dp12

+M2q12 +
dF1
dp12
= 0;
which has solution
dF1
dp12
=  M2q12;
dF2
dp12
=M1p12q
0
12;
and for calls to other networks
  (n  1)

M (1  1+2) q1j +
dF1
dp1j

+
dF2
dp1j
  (n  2)M1p1jq01j = 0;
  (n  1) dF2
dp1j
+

M (1  1+2) q1j +
dF1
dp1j

  (n  2)M1p1jq01j = 0;
with solution
dF1
dp1j
=  M
 
(1  1+2) q1j + 1p1jq01j

;
dF2
dp1j
=  M1p1jq01j:
That is, in both cases the adjustment in xed fees exactly compensates for the change in
surplus of subscribers on the originating and terminating network. The merged network
maximizes 1 + 2, which has rst-order conditions (with ~c1j =
P
l 6=1;2 lc1l=(1  1+2))
0 =
d (1 + 2)
dp12
=M212 [q12 + (p12   c12)q012   q12 + (a2   ct2)q012 + p12q012] ;
0 =
d (1 + 2)
dp1j
=M1

(1  1+2)
 
q1j + (p1j   ~c1j)q01j   q1j

  1+2p1jq01j

The resulting prot-maximizing call prices are
p12 =
co1 + ct2
1 + 
; p1j =
P
l 6=1;2 lc1l
1  (1 + )1+2
;
with corresponding values for p21 and p2j. That is, as expected calls between the merged
networks are priced e¢ ciently as on-net calls, while o¤-net call prices are set based on the
merged networksjoint market share.
Subscription fees: We now determine the Nash equilibrium through networkschoice
of subscription fee. First note from the market share equation (1) that the e¤ect of xed
fees on market shares is given by
dj
dFi
=  Hji:
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A non-merging rm i maximizes i, which has rst-order condition
0 =
di
dFi
=  MHii
 
M
nX
j=1
jRij +Nqi + Fi   fi
!
+Mi
 
1  M
nX
j=1
HjiRij
!
;
or
Fi = fi  Nqi +M
nX
j=1
j

R̂ij  Rij

;
where we have dened the matrix R̂ = (R̂ij)nn with
R̂ii =
1
MHii
 
nX
j=1
Hji
Hii
Rij; R̂ij = 0 8 j 6= i:
After the merger between rms 1 and 2, the rst-order conditions for the non-merging
rms remain unchanged. As concerns the merged rm, its rst-order conditions for max-
imizing 1 + 2 with respect to F1 and F2 can be expressed as
H11x1 +H21x2 =
1

  r1; H12x1 +H22x2 =
2

  r2;
where for i = 1; 2;
xi =M
Xn
k=1
kRik + Fi +NQi   fi; ri =M
Xn
k=1
Hki (1R1k + 2R2k) :
The resulting xed fees are again given by the above expression, where now
R̂11 =
H22
M
 
Pn
k=1 (H22Hk1  H21Hk2)R1k
H11H22  H21H12
;
R̂12 =  
H21
M
+
Pn
k=1 (H22Hk1  H21Hk2)R2k
H11H22  H21H12
;
similar for R̂21 and R̂22, and R̂ij = 0 for all i = 1; 2 and j  3, and R̂ii as above for i  3.
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Annex B E¢ ciency Gains from the Orange/T-Mobile Merger59
Orange and T-Mobile forecast e¢ ciency gains totalling £ 545m a year from 2015 on-
wards.60 However in the preceding years 2010 to 2014, forecast annual gains are generally
lower than this due to implementation costs and the phasing-in of savings. Orange and
T-Mobile forecast:
 annual operating expenditure (opex) savings of £ 445m from 2014 onwards;
 the phasing-in of opex savings at 15% of £ 445m in 2010, 75% of £ 445m in 2012,
and 100% of £ 445m in 2014;
 opex integration costs to net o¤ these savings totalling between £ 600m and £ 800m
between 2010 and 2014;
 annual net capital expenditure (capex) savings of £ 100m from 2015 onwards;
 total net capex savings of £ 620m between 2010 and 2014; and
 a Net Present Value (NPV) of over £ 3.5bn in net savings.
We have used this information to estimate the equivalent level annuity which would
match these e¢ ciency gains, i.e. a constant per annum net saving which delivers the same
NPV as the variable prole of savings described above.
We do not know the forecasting horizon over which the NPV of £ 3.5bn has been
calculated, nor do we know some of the detailed cashow assumptions used to calculate
that NPV (e.g. phasing of opex savings in 2011, precise level of integration costs). We
have therefore developed a range of annuity estimates for each of two assumed forecasting
horizons: 25 years and 100 years. In each case, we have calculated the level annuity
equivalent to a high gain scenario, where the detailed assumptions are assumed to deliver
relatively high gains within the envelope provided by the available information (e.g. opex
savings in 2011 assumed at 50% of £ 445m, integration costs assumed at £ 600m); and a
low gain scenario at the other extreme (e.g. opex savings in 2011 assumed at 30% of £
445m, integration costs assumed at £ 800m).
For each scenario, we have calculated the discount rate that would generate an NPV
of £ 3.5bn for the given forecasting horizon and set of detailed assumptions, and then
59We are grateful to Adam Mantzos for preparing this annex.
60All gures sourced from the presentation, Combination of Orange UK & T-Mobile UK: Creating a
new mobile champion, Orange and T-Mobile, 8 September 2009.
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calculated the level annuity which, over that same forecasting horizon, would also generate
an NPV of £ 3.5bn.
Our results are shown below:
Equivalent level annuity (£m) High gain Low gain
25 year horizon 410 388
100 year horizon 419 399
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